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THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001: POLICY AND PRECEDENT
 Eleven days after 9/11, Congress passed a law providing that any victims who 
wanted to come into an administrative no-fault system and receive compensation as 
if they were in the tort system could do so.1 This law established the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2011 (the “9/11 Fund” or the “Fund”). It was voluntary 
and allowed individuals to receive compensation but avoid litigation if they signed a 
release stating that they would not sue anyone (except the terrorists or countries 
harboring terrorists) for damages resulting from the 9/11 attacks.2
 Over the course of thirty-three months, we corralled ninety-seven percent of all 
the death claims through this fund.3 And we paid 2600 physical injury claims.4 
Imagine if there was no 9/11 Fund. With no appropriation from Congress, I was 
asked to take money out of the U.S. Treasury (“Ken, take it out of petty cash from 
the U.S. Treasury.” That’s how the program worked.). The Fund was supported by 
$7 billion in taxpayer money, and we secured virtually all the releases possible up to 
the statutory expiration date of December 22, 2003. However, after the statute 
expired, thousands of physical injury claimants came forward—these were latent 
claims for physical injuries that began to manifest themselves. Unfortunately, there 
was no longer a fund, so those claimants had to sue; and those cases, for the most 
part, have settled, years later.
 Often it is asked whether the Fund was sound public policy. I believe that it was. 
I have publicly stated over and over again that I believe it was the right thing to do. 
However, it is a very close question. Very close. I think it was the right thing to do 
because it was a unique response to an unprecedented national tragedy rivaled only 
by the American Civil War, Pearl Harbor, and the assassination of President Kennedy. 
On the other hand, one cannot justify the 9/11 Fund from the perspective of the 
victims of such tragedies or other disasters. I certainly cannot. We would have to be 
able to explain why there was a 9/11 Fund for the 9/11 victims, but none for the 
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. And why there was no fund for the victims 
of Katrina, in which 1000 people died. There was no Hurricane Katrina fund. There 
was also no fund last year for the victims of the tornadoes in Joplin, Missouri, and 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama. These tragedies had innocent victims and yet the government 
did not step up and pay those victims $2 million on average, as was the case for the 
9/11 Fund.
1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, tit. IV, §§ 401–09, 115 
Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). The purpose of the 9/11 Fund was “to 
provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically injured 
or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes.” Id. § 403.
2. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B). 
3. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims, Sept. 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001, http://www.justice.gov/archive/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html (last updated Jan. 
28, 2005).
4. Kenneth Feinberg, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Final Report of the Special Master for the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, at 110 tbl.12 (2004), www.justice.gov/final_
report.pdf.
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 However, I do not believe that the 9/11 Fund, as successful as it appears from the 
statistics, can serve as a precedent for future tragedies. It was a one-off program; it 
will never be replicated. The idea that one person is designated by Congress through 
the Attorney General to pay 5300 people or families billions of dollars with very 
little oversight, very few checks and balances, no committees, and no real appeal 
system, and the idea to single out for special treatment a select group of people who 
are the victims of a curve ball of life’s misfortune, does not sit well.
 If Congress had waited two more weeks, it would likely not have created the 9/11 
Fund, or at least not in the same way. Most likely, Congress would not have required 
me to calculate damages and pay every person a different amount of money. In order 
to get the stockbroker and the banker’s family to give a release waiving their right to 
sue, they received much more payment than the busboy, the soldier, the fireman, or 
the policeman. Tied to the hip of the tort system, I had to give everyone different 
amounts to attract them out of litigation.
 Yet I defend the 9/11 Fund. The American people wanted to demonstrate to the 
world the best of our heritage, that we will come to the aid of those in need, that we 
are one community, that we will find a way to help people who were victims of the 
attacks. It is a part of the American character. Therefore, I think that creating the 
9/11 Fund was absolutely the right thing to do. Just don’t do it again. And, if you do 
it again, don’t do it that way.
 A common question relating to the 9/11 Fund is whether the tort system is the 
best way to resolve mass claims and claims from mass disasters. I do not know if it is 
the best way, but I believe it is the only way. Victim compensation funds, such as the 
9/11 Fund and the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Fund, are aberrations. I believe 
that generally the tort system works pretty well and, though it is not perfect, disputes 
are resolved under that system. Every once in a while, policymakers think that a 
particular tragedy requires us to think outside of the box and create an alternative 
system, and that is fine. The BP Oil and 9/11 funds offered good alternatives. But I 
do not believe that it is necessary to tinker with the tort system. The second reason 
is that the American legal system and the tort system are so ingrained in the fabric 
and history of our country that it is highly unlikely that these compensation funds or 
other alternatives will change the tort system other than at the edges. To attempt 
more is the equivalent of tilting at windmills.
 In sum, I defend the 9/11 Fund because I think it was the right thing to do. 
Moreover, I point with pride to the fact that the system and the 9/11 Fund worked 
when it had to work.
 The Fund worked in part because of the support of the legal community in New 
York City. The legal profession is often criticized, and sometimes justifiably so. But 
for an example of how our profession actually serves the public interest, look at what 
bar associations around the country did to make sure that the 9/11 Fund would 
work—not only in theory but in practice. In addition, public officials, including New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York City Corporation Counsel 
Michael Cardozo, also played a substantial role in the success of the Fund. In the 
early days of the Fund, when it was criticized and questioned by emotionally 
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distraught families and victims, Mayor Bloomberg stood by me and the Fund. In 
fact, he stood right next to me and said, “Give the Fund a chance. It’s the right thing 
to do.” I do not think we would ever have succeeded in this city without the mayor’s 
support and, day in and day out, the support of Michael Cardozo. I talked to Michael 
once a day during some of these difficult times, when trying to encourage people to 
take advantage of the Fund. And Michael took the heat, along with others in the 
Corporation Counsel’s office. They never f linched and repeatedly asked what they 
could do to help make the Fund accessible and urge citizens of this city to take 
advantage of the program.
 In the end, if statistics are a guide, the 9/11 Fund was a success. More than $7 
billion—all public taxpayer funds—were distributed to approximately 5300 eligible 
claimants.5 The average award for a death claim was about $2 million; for a physical 
injury claim, approximately $400,000.6 And these monies were distributed tax-free. 
Only ninety-four people who were eligible to enter the Fund declined and decided to 
litigate in Federal Court in Manhattan. (All of these lawsuits were settled some five 
years later.). I believe the Fund stands alone as the best historical example of the 
compassion and sensitivity of the American people. In a time of great national 
trauma, America decided to send a message to the rest of the world—that we as a 
people would stand beside those victims of a terrible tragedy, and that the terrorist 
attacks would unite, not divide, us as a nation. We showed the world that we would 
not only track down and bring to justice those responsible for the tragedy, but that 
we would also exhibit a type of “vengeful philanthropy,” demonstrating to the world 
our unified sense of community and our determination to act as one people. The 
9/11 Fund was “Exhibit A” in this regard.
5. Id.
6. Id.
